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Abstract 
In three experiments we examined the notion that interpretative thinking guides impression 
formation when playing a prisoner's dilemma game.  In a first experiment, we 
demonstrated that an interpretation goal is spontaneously triggered upon receiving 
ambiguous information about an  interaction partner in the context of a prisoner's dilemma 
game.  In Experiment 2, we examined whether accessible knowledge in this context is used 
as an interpretation frame for judging the interaction partner.  We observed that 
subliminally primed extrellle person exemplars led to an assimilation effect in person 
judgment in a prisoner's dilemma game, whereas they led to a contrast effect when person 
judgments were made in a control condition.  In experiment 3, priming a comparison goal 
before entering a prisoner's dilemma game led participants to use subliminally presented 
extreme exemplars again as a standard of comparison in the judgment of an interaction 
partner. 
Key words: Interpretation goal, prisoner's dilemma game, assimilation, contrast, extreme 
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Interpretative Thinking and Impression Formation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
In mutual dependence situations, in which partners make decisions that affect each 
other's outcomes, forming an adequate impression of one's interaction partner constitutes a 
very valuable step in the decision process.  People will value information regarding the 
other person's personality characteristics or intentions, because such information may help 
them to predict the partner's behavior and to respond effectively.  For example, participants 
who believed that they would interact with a hostile person behaved less cooperatively 
toward that person than when they believed that this other person was non-hostile (Herr, 
1986; Snyder & Swann, 1978).  Participants who expected their partner to be non-
cooperative behaved less cooperatively than when they expected their partner to be 
cooperative (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Comeille, & 
Yzerbyt, in press).  Other research and theoretical perspectives such as interdependence 
theory and equity theory (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b; Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock, Kramer, & Keil, 1984; Messick & Cook, 1983; 
Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994) also imply that cooperative behavior in prisoner's dilemma 
games and social dilemmas may be shaped by expectations or beliefs regarding the 
intentions and the behavior of the partner. 
Clearly then, in mutual dependence (i.e., interdependence) situations, forming an 
impression of the interaction partner is an important component of the cooperative 
decision-making process.  Therefore, individuals participating in such a situation (often 
captured in the lab via a prisoner's dilemma game) may be extra-motivated to make sense 
of the (often ambiguous) information received about the interaction partner and to figure Interpretation goal  4 
out who the opponent is.  Consequently, a mutual dependence relationship may 
automatically activate an interpretation goal. 
According to Stapel & Koomen (2001a), individuals with an activated interpretation 
goal are extra-motivated to understand and make sense of the world.  Interpretation 
moti~ated  individuals do not think exclusively in terms of the goal of reaching a specific 
outcome: resolving ambiguities with an open mind is their primary concern.  Interpretation 
goals function as operative processing goals and they have a strong impact on the way 
accessible knowledge is used in the disambiguation of a target person (Stapel & Kooman, 
2001a,200Ib).  Thus, informing people that they will participate in a mutual dependence 
situation (such as a prisoner's dilemma game) may trigger an interpretation goal, especially 
when the information about the interaction partner is ambiguous.  Consequently, this 
activated goal may affect the way accessible knowledge is used for judging an interaction 
partner. 
In the past, the cognitive processes that underlie impression formation in 
interdependence situations such as prisoner's dilemma games or social dilemmas have 
hardly been investigated (but see De Bruin & Van Lange, 2000).  Most research has 
focused on differences in impressions as a function of the social value orientation of 
decision makers, but this research failed to address the cognitive processes underlying 
impression formation (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b; Liebrand, Jansen, 
Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & 
Liebrand, 1989, 1991a, 1991b; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998).  Therefore, in the 
present research we will examine the role of one particular type of cognitive process, Interpretation goal  5 
namely interpretative thinking, and its association with impression formation in a prisoner's 
dilemma game. 
Accessible Knowledge in Person Judgment 
How one judges (often ambiguous) information about an interaction partner is often 
a function of the kind of knowledge that is most accessible during the impression formation 
process.  During judgment accessible information can serve either as an interpretation 
frame or as a comparison standard (Higgins, 1989, 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Sherif & 
Hovland, 1961; Wyer & SSUll,  1989).  When encoding ambiguous stimuli, trait concepts or 
stereotypes that become activated, will be used primarily as an interpretation frame.  As a 
consequence, judgments of a target person will shift toward the activated information (i.e., 
an assimilation effect).  Srull and Wyer (1979) used a Scrambled Sentence Test to 
unobtrusively prime the concepts "hostility" versus "kindness".  Mter this task, participants 
judged a description of a target person (Donald) whose actions were ambiguous with 
respect to hostility.  Results showed assimilation to the primed concepts: Donald was rated 
as more hostile following the priming of the hostility trait and more kind following the 
priming of the kindness trait (for similar results see also Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; 
Devine, 1989; Erdley & D'  Agostino, 1988; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 
1980; Stapel & Koomen, 1998). 
Accessible knowledge does not always serve as an interpretation frame in person 
judgments.  If it is sufficiently extreme, it tends to be used as a relevant comparison 
standard (e.g., in case of extreme person exemplars).  When a particular extreme person 
exemplar is activated, therefore, person judgments will shift away from the activated Interpretation goal  6 
information (i.e., a contrast effect).  Herr (1986) primed his participants with names of 
famous people.  He found that participants primed with person exemplars of extreme 
hostility (e.g., Hitler) judged Donald as being less hostile than participants primed with 
person exemplars of extreme non-hostility (e.g., Santa Claus), which is a contrast effect. 
However, when the primed person names were moderately hostile (e.g., Alice Cooper) or 
moderately non-hostile (e.g., Henry Kissinger) an assimilation effect occurred.  This study 
together with others (e.g., Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; 
Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Stapel, Koomen, & Van der Pligt, 1996, 1997) 
demonstrates that the perceived extremity of the accessible knowledge acts as an essential 
moderator of the occurrence of assimilation versus contrast.  Extreme information is more 
likely to be used as a standard of comparison than moderate information or more abstract 
concepts such as traits and stereotypes, which in tum are more likely to be used as an 
interpretation frame. 
Interpretation Goal and Accessible Knowledge 
Stapel & Koomen (2001a) have claimed that when people are extra-motivated to 
understand and make sense of a stimulus, accessibility-driven encoding effects are more 
likely to occur than when such a goal is not active.  Someone who is motivated to make 
sense of a stimulus will find it difficult to accept that a stimulus is ambiguous.  Therefore, 
accessible information will be used more readily and extensively in the encoding or 
disambiguation of a target stimulus, when an interpretation goal is active.  For example, 
Stapel & Koomen (2001a) demonstrated that priming narrow and moderate trait concepts 
that were descriptively inapplicable to the interpretation of a target stimulus resulted in Interpretation goal  7 
assimilation when an interpretation goal was primed, but not when this goal was not 
activated.  They also showed that priming descriptively applicable traits affected a larger 
range of target judgments under interpretation conditions.  Stapel & Koomen (200 1  b) 
showed that a primed interpretation goal also determines the direction of knowledge 
acces~ibility effects.  In several experiments, they showed that even priming of extreme 
person exemplars led to assimilation effects on impression formation under interpretation 
conditions. 
Thus, an important determinant of the direction of knowledge accessibility effects is 
the type of processing set that is relatively active in a particular situation.  Not only an 
interpretation goal may determine the direction of knowledge accessibility effects.  Stapel 
& Koomen (2001b), for instance, demonstrated that when a comparison goal is activated, 
accessible knowledge is more likely to be used in the formation of a standard and that 
contrast is then more likely to occur.  They showed that priming abstract traits, which 
normally lead to assimilation effects in impression formation, resulted in contrast effects 
when a comparison goal was activated. 
The Present Research 
We will examine whether and how interpretative thinking is active during 
impression formation in a mutual dependence relationship.  Individuals in such a 
relationship should be extra-motivated to disambiguate information received about an 
interaction partner.  Three studies were designed to explore this issue.  In Experiment 1, we 
examined whether an interpretation goal gets triggered automatically when ambiguous 
information about an interaction partner is received in the context of a prisoner's dilemma Interpretation goal  8 
game.  If  we can observe this, it then follows that all accessible knowledge should be used 
as an interpretation frame, resulting in an assimilation effect (Stapel & Koomen, 2001a, 
2001b).  To demonstrate this, we designed Experiment 2 in which we introduced extreme 
person exemplars (e.g., Hitler, Mandela), which normally serve as a standard of comparison 
in person judgment, and which normally result in a contrast effect.  Experiment 2 was 
designed to reveal whether subliminally primed extreme person exemplars would result in 
an assimilation effect rather than the standard contrast effect when judging an interaction 
partner in the specific context of a prisoner's dilemma game.  Finally, we investigated 
whether the use of an interpretation frame during impression formation in a prisoner's 
dilemma game situation could be overridden by activating a comparison goal before 
individuals enter that situation (Experiment 3). 
Experiment 1 
In this first experiment, we tried to demonstrate that an interpretation goal is 
triggered when people are invited to playa prisoner's dilemma game.  To that end we 
compared the presence of an interpretation goal in people who were about to playa 
prisoner's dilemma game to people who merely expected to play an otherwise undefined 
game against another person.  To demonstrate that the mutual dependence present in a 
prisoner's dilemma game is the key factor that triggers an interpretation goal (who is my 
opponent?) and not just the fact that people are playing a game with another person, we 
added a condition in which participants expected to playa dictator game.  A dictator game 
is characterized by unilateral dependence: an individual (the dictator) gets to allocate 
money to himself and another person who has no decision power.  We did not expect the Interpretation goal  9 
presence of an interpretational goal in this condition, because it has been shown that in this 
game impressions about the other person do not playa strong role (Eckel & Grossman, 
1996, 1998; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; lohannesson & Person, 2000).  People in a 
dictator game may therefore not be extra-motivated to disambiguate an ambiguously 
described partner. 
To measure the presence of an interpretational orientation, prior to playing the game 
(but following its introduction) participants had to perform a lexical decision task that 
measured the accessibility of words designating 'interpretation' and of unrelated words. 
We predicted that words designating interpretation would be more accessible and would 
therefore elicit shorter response latencies than unrelated words in the prisoner's dilemma 
game condition compared to the dictator game condition and the control condition. 
Experiment la 
Method 
Participants and design.  Participants were 36 undergraduate students who 
participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The experimental design included 
two factors.  These two factors were Game context (prisoner's dilemma game vs. dictator 
game vs. control condition) and Target words (interpretation related vs. neutral). 
Procedure and materials.  On arrival in the laboratory, each participant was placed 
in an individual cubicle.  Participants were told that they would participate in some 
unrelated studies.  In a short while they would be playing a game with another person.  The 
other person, however, was doing another experiment at the moment and participants were 
told that they had to play the game when he would arrive.  Participants would already Interpretation goal  10 
receive a written description of the other person and some participants (those in the 
prisoner's dilemma game and the dictator game conditions) were first instructed about the 
rules of their game.  We took care that no part of the instructions contained any reference to 
interpretation related words (or to the neutral words used in the lexical decision task).  After 
these instructions, participants were requested to perform the other experiment (i.e., the 
lexical decision task) first, as they were waiting for the other person to actually play the 
game. 
Game context manipulation.  Participants in the control condition were simply told 
that they were going to playa game against the other person without any specification of 
the content of the game.  They only received a written description of the other person.  As 
in Herr (1986), participants received an ambiguous description of the interaction partner's 
behavior in  another setting,  ostensibly written by an acquaintance who had had a recent 
encounter  with  the  participant's  interaction  partner.  The  description  consisted  of an 
account of "Jan", whose behavior could be categorized as either hostile or non-hostile.  The 
description was  a modification of the familiar "Donald" paragraph developed by Srull and 
Wyer (1979,  1980; see also Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989).  Because in the 
original paragraph Donald could be categorized as vaguely hostile (see Higgins, 1996), we 
modified this paragraph to make sure that ours was really neutral!.  Participants were then 
requested to rate this person on 10 unipolar trait dimensions that were adapted from Srull & 
Wyer (1979;  1980; see Stapel et aI.,  1997).  Five of these dimensions implied either a high 
or  low  degree  of  hostility  ("hostile",  "unkind",  "aggressive",  "considerate",  and 
"amicable"),  and  5  other  dimensions  were  unrelated  to  hostility  ("selfish",  "fretful", 
"intelligent",  "dependable",  "helpful").  Related  and  unrelated  scales  were  interspersed. Interpretation goal  11 
Ratings  were made along  a scale ranging between 1 (not at all)  and 9 (extremely).  The 
unrelated scales measured  several target characteristics  that show  no descriptive  overlap 
with the target description.  According to the literature on knowledge accessibility effects, 
primes should affect judgments that are relevant tot the primed construct but not judgments 
on irrelevant dimensions (Higgins,  1996a).  Thus, judgments unrelated to hostility should 
not show a pattern of assimilation or contrast. The unrelated measures in our experiment 
are also often included in research using the Donald paradigm to  decrease the  possibility 
that participants  would become suspicious  that the  concept of interest is  often  hostility 
related (see Stapel & Koomen, 2001; Stapel et aI., 1996, 1997). 
Participants in the prisoner's dilemma game condition received the same description 
of Jan, but prior to receiving this description they received instructions relevant to the game 
they would play against him.  The game we used was adapted from previous research (e.g., 
De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  Participants were 
told that they and their interaction partner would each receive four chips.  Each chip had a 
value of 10 points to the participant himself or herself and a value of 20 points to the 
partner.  The partner also received four chips of which each had a value of 10 points to the 
partner and a value of 20 points to the participant himself or herself.  Participants had to 
decide how many chips to give to the partner.  They were told that the partner also had to 
decide how many chips to give to the participant himself or herself. 
Participants in the dictator game condition were also informed of the rules of their 
game before receiving the ambiguous description of their interaction partner.  The 
instructions for this game were also adapted from previous research (e.g., Hoffman et aI., 
1996).  Each participant was given eight chips, each worth 10 points.  They were told that Interpretation goal  12 
the interaction partner did not receive anything.  The participant (i.e., the dictator) could 
unilaterally decide about the allocation of the points.  Participants could either keep the 
points entirely for themselves, or hand whatever proportion they wanted to the partner. 
Lexical decision task.  Next, participants were asked to perform a lexical decision 
task.  This task was adapted from Dijksterhuis et al. (1998).  Participants were told that they 
would perform a word recognition task, the goal of which was to find out how fast people 
could discriminate between words and non-words.  They were asked to focus on the screen 
every time a fixation-cross appeared.  A string of letters would appear on the screen and 
they were asked to decide as fast as possible whether this letter string was an existing word 
or not by pressing a key on the keyboard (' l' for an existing word, '3' for a non-existing 
word). 
The lexical decision task consisted of 24 trials.  In 12 cases, the target string was an 
existing word, whereas in the remaining 12 cases, the target strings were random letter 
strings (e.g., hibbt, truuv).  Of the 12 existing target words, 6 words were associated with 
interpretation (e.g., understand, comprehend, grasp) and 6 were neutral words unrelated to 
interpretation (e.g., walk, throw, jump).  The interpretation related words and the neutral 
words were matched for word length2.  The fixation-cross was presented for 500 ms. 
Subsequently, the target string appeared on the screen until participants responded.  The 
computer recorded the time it took participants to respond.  After participants responded, 
the screen remained blank for 2000 ms after which a new trial began. 
After the lexical decision task, participants were informed that their interaction 
partner had arrived and that they could perform the game they had been instructed about. 
Participants in the control condition were randomly instructed with either the rules of the Interpretation goal  13 
prisoner's dilemma game or the dictator game.  Of course, the decisions that these 
participants made were not of our interest.  After making their decisions, participants were 
requested to fill out a post-experimental questionnaire, which probed their suspicion about 
any relatedness among the tasks and about any relatedness among the words in the lexical 
decision task.  None of our participants reported any suspicion.  Finally, participants were 
thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Only the results for the 'word trials' were included in the analysis.  We  calculated 
the mean latency for each of the target words (cf. De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; 
Hermans,  De  Houwer,  &  Eelen,  1994;  Mussweiler  &  Foerster,  2000).  To  reduce  the 
distorting effect of outliers, data points that were three standard deviations above or below 
the mean for each word (0.7%) were considered outliers and were dropped from subsequent 
analysis (see  Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Blair & Banaji,  1996), together with  data points 
from trials  on  which an incorrect response was  given  (1.1%).  The remaining  latencies 
(98.2%) were subjected to a 3 (Game context: prisoner's dilemma game vs.  dictator game 
vs.  control condition) x 2 (Target words:  interpretation related vs.  neutral) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor3• 
This  analysis revealed main effects of game  context and  target words.  The main 
effect of game context, F(2, 33) = 4.86, P < .05, revealed that participants in a prisoner's 
dilemma game  context (M = 493  ms) responded faster to words presented on  the screen 
than participants in a dictator game context (M = 507 ms) or control participants (M =  509). 
The  main  effect  of target  words,  F(l,  33)  =  6.21,  P  <  .01,  revealed  that  participants Interpretation goal  14 
responded faster to interpretation related words (M =  499) than to neutral words (M =  507). 
These  main  effects  were  qualified  by  a  significant  two-way  interaction  between  game 
context and target words, F(2, 33) = 3.70, p < .05.  Mean reaction times are represented in 
Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Participants in the prisoner's dilemma game condition (M = 483 ms) showed shorter 
response latencies to interpretation related words than to neutral words (M = 503 ms), F(1, 
33) = 13.38, p < .001.  In the dictator game condition and the control condition, there were 
no differences in reaction times to interpretation related words and neutral words, Fs < 1, 
ns.  Further analyses showed that reaction times to neutral words did not differ among the 
different game contexts, F(2,  33) < 1,  I1S.  Reaction times to interpretation related words, 
however, differed  among the  different game contexts, F(2,  33) = 8.20, p < .01.  Planned 
comparisons showed that participants in the prisoner's dilemma game condition (M = 483 
ms)  responded faster to interpretation related words than participants in the dictator game 
condition (M = 506 ms), F(I, 33) = 11.10, p < .01, and control participants (M = 509 ms), 
F(1,  33) = 13.39, p  < .0001.  There was no difference in reaction times to interpretation 
related words  among participants in the dictator game condition and control participants, 
Fs(l, 33) < 1, I1S. 
These findings clearly demonstrate that an interpretation goal gets triggered 
spontaneously when people are forming an impression in the context of a prisoner's 
dilemma game.  Forming an impression in a dictator game context or in an unspecified Interpretation goal  15 
game context did not trigger an interpretation goal.  Indeed, concepts related to 
interpretation were more accessible when participants formed an impression of their 
interaction partner in a prisoner's dilemma game than in a dictator game or in the control 
condition.  As noted before, impressions are an important antecedent of cooperative 
decision-making in mutual dependence relationships (e.g., Smeesters et aI., in press; Van 
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  Therefore, when engaging in a prisoner's dilemma game, 
participants might be extra-motivated to make sense of the ambiguous information of an 
interaction partner.  In a dictator game, impressions are not important for cooperative 
decision-making.  As a consequence, people in such a situation are not extra-motivated to 
interpret ambiguous information of the other.  This finding illustrates that the 
interdependence character of a situation is a strong cue for triggering an interpretation goal. 
It might be argued that the results obtained would only hold under conditions in 
which participants are overtly focused on forming an impression of the interaction partner. 
In fact, in the experiment just described, after begin handed a description of their 
interaction partner participants were instructed to rate that partner explicitly on 10 
dimensions.  Although this feature of the procedure does not by any means render the first 
experiment invalid (the feature was present in all conditions), it still might be the case that 
the differences observed would disappear in the absence of an overt impression formation 
task. 
Past research suggests however that the effect should still be apparent.  Indeed; 
Smeesters et al. (in press, Experiment 1) observed that impressions of an interaction partner 
influence cooperative decision-making in a prisoner's dilemma game in the absence of 
overt expressions of these impressions.  Still, the claim that participation in a prisoner's Interpretation goal  16 
dilemma game by itself extra-motivates people to process ambiguous information of the 
interaction partner would be stronger, if we could demonstrate that merely having to read 
an ambiguous description of an interaction partner, but without having to make an overt 
judgment, is sufficient to trigger an interpretation goal.  We conducted a follow-up 
experiment to test this question.  Compared to Experiment la, we omitted the dictator game 
condition and focused solely on the prisoner's dilemma game condition and the control 
condition. 
Experiment 1  b 
Method 
Participants and design.  Sixteen undergraduates participated in this experiment in 
partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The experimental design included two factors: 
Game context (prisoner's dilemma game vs. control condition) and Target words 
(interpretation related vs. neutral). 
Procedure.  This experiment was identical to Experiment la with the exception that 
participants had to perform the lexical decision task immediately after having read the 
ambiguous description of their interaction partner.  They did not have to make any person 
judgments.  Participants did not indicate any suspicion about a relationship between the 
different tasks of this experiment. 
Results and Discussion.  As in Experiment la, we calculated the mean latency for 
each of the target words.  Data points from trials on which an incorrect response was given 
were  excluded  from  the  analysis  (0.6%),  together  with  all  data  points  that  were  three 
standard  deviations  above  or  below  the  mean  for  each  word  (1.8%).  The  remaining Interpretation goal  17 
decision  latencies  (97.6%)  were  analyzed  using  a 2  (Game  context:  prisoner's  dilemma 
game vs.  control condition) x 2 (Target words: interpretation related vs.  neutral) ANOV  A 
with repeated measures on the last factor4• 
This analysis  revealed  a marginally  significant interaction between game  context 
and target words, F(I, 14) = 4.03, P < .07.  Means are presented in Table 2.  The marginal 
significance  may  be  attributed  to  a  lack  of  statistical  power.  Importantly  however, 
participants  in  the prisoner's  dilemma game condition responded faster to  interpretation 
related words (M = 481  ms) than to neutral words (M = 512 ms), F(I, 14) = 5.54, p < .05. 
In the control condition, there was no difference in reaction times to interpretation related 
words  (M = 511  ms)  and  neutral  words  (M = 505  ms),  F(I,  14)  <  1,  ns.  Further, 
participants  in the  prisoner's  dilemma  game  condition  showed  shorter  latencies  toward 
interpretation related words (M = 481  ms) than control participants (M = 511  ms), F(1, 14) 
= 4.99, P < .05.  Neutral word latencies did not differ between participants in the prisoner's 
dilemma game condition (M = 512) and control participants (M = 505 ms) = F(I, 14) < 1, 
ns.  These  results  clearly  replicated  those  of Experiment  1  and  they  showed  that  an 
interpretation  goal is  triggered  even  when  participants  are  not  asked  to  make  an  overt 
judgment of the interaction partner in a prisoner's dilemma game. 
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 provided encouraging support for our assumption that encountering 
ambiguous information about a future interaction partner goes together with interpretative 
thinking.  It is essential however to move beyond this demonstration and to assess in a more 
direct manner the impact of interpretative thinking while playing a prisoner's dilemma 
game on actual person judgment.  If a mutual dependence relationship activates an 
interpretative mindset, then accessible knowledge should be used as an interpretation 
framework when judging an interaction partner, resulting in an assimilation effect (Stapel 
& Koomen, 200la, 200lb). For instance, priming extreme person exemplars should then 
lead to assimilation effects in person judgment, although they normally lead to contrast 
effects. 
The present experiment will be a partial replication of an experiment by Herr (1986, 
Experiment 2).  In his experiment, participants also had to playa prisoner's dilemma game 
with an interaction partner, about whom they received ambiguous information. Before 
judging the interaction partner, participants were primed with extreme exemplars of 
hostility and non-hostility.  If one assumes that playing a prisoner's dilemma game triggers 
an interpretation goal, one would expect an assimilation effect.  However, Herr observed a 
standard contrast effect: extreme exemplars of hostility led to less hostile judgments than 
extreme exemplars of non-hostility.  To explain this anomalous finding it is important to 
observe that Herr's participants, prior to forming an impression of the interaction partner, 
were only told that they would be playing 'a game', without even being told that it would 
be a prisoner's dilemma game.  In view also of the results of our own Experiments la and 
lb, which showed that in the control ('a game') condition an interpretative orientation was Interpretation goal  19 
less activated, it can be argued that a pattern of  judgments different from Herr's would be 
observed following a modification of his experimental paradigm.  Specifically, when 
participants are informed that they will be playing the mutually dependent prisoner's 
dilemma game, the activation of an interpretation set of mind should yield an assimilation 
effect of extreme exemplar primes rather than a contrast effect. 
As another non-trivial difference from Herr's study, we chose to present the primes 
subliminally.  It has often been argued that contrast effects obtained with extreme 
exemplars result from the fact that extreme stimuli might be more memorable and therefore 
remain longer in consciol1sness (e.g., Carlston & Smith, 1996; Higgins, 1989; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992; Strack, 1992).  The resulting greater awareness of the priming event may 
instigate a correction-for-bias process, inducing individuals to shift their judgments in a 
reverse direction (Martin, 1986; Strack, Schwarz, Bless Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). 
However, subliminally presenting extreme exemplars will exclude such explanations. 
None of the effects that we would obtain with extreme person exemplars could be attributed 
to the fact that participants are aware of the fact that they are primed with such extreme 
stimuli. 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-three undergraduates participated in partial 
fulfillment of course requirements.  They were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Game 
context: prisoner's dilemma game vs. control condition) x 2 (Extreme exemplars: positive 
vs. negative) between-participants design. Interpretation goal  20 
Procedure and materials.  Upon entering the laboratory, participants were led to a 
cubicle containing a computer.  As in Experiment 1, all participants were told that they 
would participate in unrelated studies.  They were told that they would shortly be playing a 
game with another person.  The other person, however, was doing another experiment at 
the moment and participants were told that they had to play the game when he would 
arrive.  Participants in the control condition were told that they would play "a game" 
without any further specifications about the rules of that game.  Participants in the 
prisoner's dilemma game condition were explained the rules of the game and received the 
same instructions as the participants in the prisoner's dilemma game condition of 
Experiment l. 
Extreme exemplar priming manipulation.  Next, participants were asked to perform 
the other experiment first, while waiting for the interaction partner.  The task that they had 
to perform was a word recognition task.  Participants were seated in front of a computer 
screen.  They were told they would be presented with 14letter strings appearing one by one 
on the screen.  Half of these letter strings were existing words, while the other half were 
non-existing words.  On each trial, a fixation point first appeared on the computer screen. 
Participants had to press the key '2' to start the presentation of a trial.  On each trial, they 
had to decide as fast as possible whether a string was an existing word or not by pressing a 
key on the keyboard (' l' for an existing word, '3' for a non-existing word). 
These 14 strings were preceded by subliminal primes.  In the positive exemplar 
priming condition, each letter string was preceded by one of the following names: 
"Gandhi", "Sinterklaas" (St. Nicholas), "Mandela", "Jezus" (Jesus), "Maria" (Mary), 
"Darniaan" (Damian), and "Evita".  In the negative exemplar priming condition, each letter Interpretation goal  21 
string was preceded by one of the following names: "Hitler", "Stalin", "Dracula", "Duivel" 
(Devil), "Dutroux", "Saddam", and "Mobutu". Prime words were presented for 17 ms and 
masked by a row of X' s ("XXXXXXXXXXXX").  This row remained on the screen for 
225 ms and was immediately followed by the target word.  In all conditions, the 7 different 
prim~s were used and all these primes were used twice. 
Impression formation.  After participants finished the word recognition task, they 
were told that an acquaintance of their interaction partner had written an account of a recent 
encounter with him.  At this point, each participant was given the same ambiguous 
description of "Jan" as in Experiment 1.  Next, each participant was requested to evaluate 
his or her partner on the basis of his or her general impression after reading the description. 
The rating forms were the same as in Experiment 1, with 5 trait dimensions related to 
hostility ("hostile", "unkind", "aggressive", "considerate", and "amicable") and 5 trait 
dimensions unrelated to hostility ("selfish", "fretful", "intelligent", "dependable", 
"helpful").  The rating scales were presented in a random order, and ratings were made 
along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
Following completion of the impression measures, participants were informed that 
their interaction partner had arrived, and that they could perform the game they had been 
instructed about.  Participants in the control condition then received the instructions of the 
prisoner's dilemma game that the participants in the other game condition received at the 
beginning of the experiment.  After making their decisions, participants were requested to 
fill out a post-experimental questionnaire, which probed their suspicion about any 
relatedness among tasks and for awareness of the priming stimuli. We used the funneled 
debriefing procedure designed by Bargh & Chartrand (2000; see also Chartrand & Bargh, Interpretation goal  22 
1996). None of the participants reported any suspicion.  Finally, participants were thanked 
and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
The ratings on the five hostility related scales were combined to form a composite 
hostility index of Jan (Cronbach's a =  0.76).  Table 3 shows participants' mean ratings on 
this composite index.  Because our manipulations had no effects on the unrelated ratings of 
Jan, they are not discussed further here. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The mean hostility ratings of Jan were investigated by performing a 2 (Game 
context: prisoner's dilemma game vs. control condition) x 2 (Extreme exemplars: positive 
vs. negative) between-participants ANOV  A.  This analysis revealed the predicted two-way 
interaction between game context and extreme exemplars, Eel, 69) = 12.34,12 < .001.  In 
the control condition, we obtained the predicted contrast effect, E(l, 69) = 3.98, 12 < .05. 
Ratings of Jan were more negative when primed with positive exemplars (M = 4.73) than 
when primed with negative exemplars (M = 4.07).  In the prisoner's dilemma game 
condition, however, the results represented an assimilation effect, E(l, 69) = 8.87, 12 < .01. 
Ratings of Jan were more negative when primed with negative exemplars (M =  4.94) than 
when primed with positive exemplars (M =  3.96). 
These results provide further support for the hypothesis that impression formation in 
a prisoner's dilemma game context is associated with interpretative thinking.  Accessible Interpretation goal  23 
knowledge, through the activation of extreme person exemplars, resulted in assimilation 
when judgments of the other person had to be made in a prisoner's dilemma game context, 
whereas contrast occurred in a non-specified game context.  The latter finding replicates the 
finding of Herr (1986, Experiment 2).  The assimilation finding that we obtain with extreme 
person exemplars also matches the finding of Stapel & Koomen (2001b),who primed an 
interpretation goal before participants had to judge the ambiguous description of another 
person.  We extended their results by showing that an interpretation goal might also be 
triggered by the context of a specific situation itself.  In such a context where individuals 
are extra-motivated to make sense of who the opponent is, extreme person exemplars seem 
to be used as an interpretation framework when judging this person. 
The assimilation and contrast findings in our study were obtained with subliminally 
primed extreme person exemplars.  Hence, our findings cannot be explained in terms of a 
conscious effect of the primes on judgments.  Therefore, the classic contrast finding that we 
replicated in our study can only be explained via a comparison-based process and not via a 
correction-based process.  The latter process emerges when an individual recognizes the 
potential of primes to bias behavioral responses (Strack et al., 1993).  Most of the previous 
studies that investigated the effects of extreme prime stimuli used only supraliminal 
priming techniques (e.g., Herr, 1986; Herr et al., 1983; Stapel & Koomen, 2001b; Stapel et 
al., 1997, 1998).  Therefore, the only way to dispel any correction-based processes is to use 
subliminal priming. Interpretation goal  24 
Experiment 3 
The previous experiments showed that (a) an interpretation goal gets triggered 
during impression formation in a prisoner's dilemma game (Experiment 1) and (b) in the 
same context, the impact of accessible knowledge on the judgment of another person shifs 
in assimilative ways (Experiment 2).  Conversely, when people are not in the context of a 
prisoner's dilemma game and might therefore be less motivated to interpret the ambiguous 
behavior of another person, priming extreme exemplars results in contrast effects on person 
judgment. 
Stapel & Koomen (2001b) demonstrated that, aside from interpretation goals, in 
some settings comparison goals may steer how accessible knowledge is used.  When the 
latter goal is activated accessible knowledge gets used as a standard of comparison, which 
results in contrast effects on person judgment.  In the present experiment, we wanted to 
examine what happens when we prime a comparison goal before participants enter a 
prisoner's dilemma game situation.  In other words, what happens when people are in a 
comparison mindset and enter a situation which - on its own - triggers an interpretation 
mindset?  Will these people still use accessible knowledge as an interpretation framework 
or rather as a standard of comparison? 
It is often argued that engagement in a comparison process overrides potential 
assimilation effects.  Priming individuals with extreme exemplars may activate abstract 
concepts (e.g., priming Hitler activates the concept of hostility), thereby eliciting a potential 
assimilation effect, but the engagement in comparison induces a contrast effect that 
overrides the assimilative effect of the activated concept (Dijksterhuis et aI., 1998; Stapel et 
aI., 1997).  The comparison evokes the contrast response, such that the assimilative effects Interpretation goal  25 
of the activated concept of hostility do not become apparent.  Fiske & Neuberg (1990) have 
argued that when abstract constructs such as traits and stereotypes are accompanied by a 
concrete individual impression, these abstract constructs get overruled by the concrete 
impression (see also Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999).  Along similar lines 
Bodenhausen, Dijksterhuis, Fiske, Stapel, and colleagues argue that at the level of 
knowledge accessibility, interpretation processes may be dominated by comparison 
processes (such as with extreme person exemplars).  We believe that the same may happen 
at the level of the antecedent information-processing goals, such that that an interpretation 
goal may be dominated by a comparison goal, i.e. a comparison goal may determine the 
direction of knowledge accessibility effects on person judgment even in a situation that 
triggers an interpretation goal. 
In the present experiment, all participants had to judge their interaction partner in 
the context of a prisoner's dilemma game, after being subliminally primed with extreme 
person exemplars.  However, for half of the participants a comparison goal was primed by 
having participants partake in a "language experiment" in which words related to a 
comparison goal were presented (as in Stapel & Koomen, 200lb), before entering a 
prisoner's dilemma game situation.  For the other half of the participants no specific 
information-processing goal was primed in the language experiment.  We predicted a 
contrast effect on person judgment in the comparison goal condition, and an assimilation 
effect in the control condition (which is a replication of the prisoner's dilemma game 
condition in Experiment 2). Interpretation goal  26 
Method 
Participants and design. The participants were 64 undergraduates who participated 
in partial fulfillment of course requirements.  The experimental design included two 
between-participants factors: Goal (comparison goal versus control condition) and Extreme 
exemplars (positive vs. negative). 
Procedure and materials.  Participants arrived in the laboratory, were led to 
individual cubicles and told that they would participate in a series of unrelated studies.  The 
experiment started with a "language experiment" in which either a comparison-processing 
goal or no specific goal was primed. 
Comparison goal priming. For this task we used a version of the Scrambled 
Sentence Test (Srull & Wyer, 1979).  The task was introduced to the participants as a 
"language skill" test.  We used 14 items, each requiring the participant to form a 
grammatically correct sentence with four of five words presented in a scrambled order. 
Prime words were embedded in 8 of the 14 items.  We created two versions ofthe 
Scrambled Sentence Test, one with comparison related words and another one with words 
unrelated to any specific information-processing goal.  In the comparison goal condition 
participants were presented with words such as "compare", "distinguish", "differ", or 
"contrast".  In the control condition these words were replaced by neutral words. 
Next, participants received the same instructions and materials as participants in the 
prisoner's dilemma game condition of Experiment 2.  Participants were informed of the 
rules of the prisoner's dilemma game.  Then, they were asked to participate in a lexical 
decision task in which they were randomly assigned to either the positive exemplar 
condition or the negative exemplar condition.  Subsequently, they received the ambiguous Interpretation goal  27 
description of Jan, who was supposed to be their opponent in the prisoner's dilemma game. 
After rating Jan on the same hostility-related and unrelated scales as in Experiments I and 
2, participants performed the prisoner's dilemma game. Finally, before they were thanked 
and fully debriefed, participants were subjected to the funneled debriefing procedure 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to probe their suspicion about any relationship between tasks or 
their awareness of priming stimuli.  None of the participants indicated any suspicion. 
Results and Discussion 
The ratings on the five hostility related scales were again combined to form a 
composite hostility index of  Jan (Cronbach's a = 0.74).  Table 4 shows participants' mean 
ratings on this composite index.  Our manipulations had no effects on the unrelated scales 
for ratings of Jan, therefore they are not discussed any further. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The mean hostility ratings of Jan were investigated by performing a 2 (Goal: 
comparison goal vs. control condition) x 2 (Extreme exemplars: positive vs. negative) 
between-participants ANOV  A.  This analysis revealed the predicted two-way interaction 
between game context and extreme exemplars, E(l, 60) =  10.85, Q < .001.  In the control 
condition, we obtained the predicted assimilation effect, E(l, 60) =  6.97, Q < .01.  Ratings 
of Jan were more negative when primed with negative exemplars eM =  4.96) than when 
primed with positive exemplars eM = 4.ll). When a comparison goal was primed before 
participants entered a prisoner's dilemma game context, we found a contrast effect, E(l, 60) Interpretation goal  28 
= 4.07, II < .05.  Ratings of Jan were more negative when primed with positive exemplars 
eM =  4.83) than when primed with negative exemplars eM =  4.18). 
In correspondence with our predictions, priming a comparison goal before bringing 
participants in a prisoner's dilemma game context led to a contrast effect in person 
judgment.  As we used a subliminal technique to prime extreme person exemplars, this 
finding cannot be explained through a correction-based process.  Therefore, primed 
exemplars must have been used as a standard of comparison.  Priming a comparison goal 
had a strong effect on person judgments even when people are brought into a situation that 
by itself triggeres an interpretation goal.  In such a situation, the activated comparison goal 
rather than the activated interpretation goal determines the direction of the knowledge 
accessibility effect. 
General Discussion 
Three studies were designed to examine whether interpretative thinking is part of 
impression formation in a mutual dependence relationship.  Being in a situation that 
requires cooperative decision-making from both partners may increase people's motivation 
to figure out with whom they are interacting.  In such a situation, individuals might engage 
in interpretative thinking to make sense of their social environment. 
Experiment 1a revealed that an interpretation goal is triggered when forming an 
impression of an interaction partner in a prisoner's dilemma game.  For these participants, 
reaction times were shorter toward interpretation related words than toward neutral words. 
This finding was not obtained for control participants or individuals participating in an 
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game).  Importantly, the increased accessibility of interpretation-related words in the 
prisoner's dilemma game condition occurs even when people do not have to make overt 
judgments of the interaction partner (Experiment 1  b).  Earlier research on social perception 
has demonstrated that people often consciously or unconsciously go beyond the 
information given without being asked for overt judgments.  Upon receiving rather 
unambiguous information about a person, one immediately tries to make sense of that 
person by inferring abstract constructs such as traits or stereotypes (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 
1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1986).  Making sense of ambiguous information is 
admittedly very difficult, but the results of  Experiment 1 suggest that people in a prisoner's 
dilemma game nevertheless engage in this process spontaneously. 
In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that priming extreme person exemplars resulted 
in an assimilation effect in person judgment in a prisoner's dilemma game context, whereas 
the classic contrast effect appeared in the control condition.  We attributed the assimilation 
effect to the activation of an interpretation goal when playing a prisoner's dilemma game. 
In such a context, accessible knowledge will be used as an interpretation framework such 
that assimilation occurs.  Finally, in Experiment 3 it was shown that priming a comparison 
goal before entering a prisoner's dilemma game situation led to a contrast effect.  The effect 
of an activated interpretation goal seems to be overridden in such a situation.  Instead of 
being used as an interpretation framework, following the priming of a comparison goal 
extreme person exemplars are used again as a standard of comparison. 
Experiments 1 and 2 support the notion that individuals playing a prisoner's 
dilemma game engage in interpretative thinking to judge their interaction partner.  Only 
Experiment 2, however, demonstrated in a direct manner that this process affects the use of illterpretation goal  30 
accessible knowledge.  We showed that playing a prisoner's dilemma game elicits 
interpretative thinking by predicting and observing that in such a context primed extreme 
exemplars lead to assimilation in person judgment instead of contrast.  Future research 
might also investigate other ways to demonstrate that an interpretation goal plays a role in a 
prisoner's dilemma game context.  For instance, a demonstration that priming narrow or 
moderate trait terms that are descriptively inapplicable to the interpretation of an interaction 
partner (and which normally do not lead to any priming effects on person judgment), leads 
to assimilation effects when judging a person in a prisoner's dilemma game would 
corroborate our results (cCStapel & Koomen, 2001a). 
Further, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 were obtained with subliminally 
presented extreme person exemplars.  This is important, as we were able to demonstrate 
that the classic contrast effect we obtained in the control condition of Experiment 2 could 
not be attributed to a correction-based process.  ill a context with primes presented below 
conscious awareness, participants can definitely not be aware of (a) the fact that there were 
any primes presented and (b) any relationship between the priming procedure and the 
judgment process (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).  Hence, the contrast effect observed can only 
be attributed to a comparison-based process, in which accessible information is used as a 
comparison standard (Stapel & Koomen, 20Dlc). 
An interesting implication of Experiment 3 is that the activation of a comparison 
goal can inhibit the occurrence of assimilation effects typically set in motion by an 
interpretation goal.  Several authors (Bodenhausen et al., 1999; Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al., 
1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1998; Stapel et al., 1997) already suggested that a comparison 
process overrides an interpretation process at the level of accessible knowledge.  Our Interpretation goal  31 
results suggest that this overriding process might also occur at the level of information-
processing goals.  Future research might investigate whether other information-processing 
goals also interact with an interpretation goal.  Past studies demonstrated that assimilation 
accessibility effects due to interpretation (such as with primed traits) vanish when people 
had an accuracy goal, i.e., the goal to accurately form a particular impression about the 
person one is judging (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Stapel, Koomen, & Zeelenberg, 1998; 
Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994) or a communication goal, i.e., 
the goal to communicate a particular impression about the person one is judging (Sedikides, 
1990).  Then, these goals might not only have an influence on assimilation effects 
associated with knowledge accessibility (traits and stereotypes) but could also have an 
influence on assimilation effects associated with an interpretation goal.  To demonstrate 
this, one could, for instance, examine whether the activation of an accuracy goal or a 
communication goal inhibits the assimilation effects we obtained with extreme person 
exemplars in a prisoner's dilemma game context (an effect associated with an interpretation 
goal). 
The findings of our experiments are also congruent with Bargh's (1990, 1997) 
theorizing on auto-motives.  He argued that goals are represented mentally and are capable 
of becoming automatically activated by environmental features.  Many studies have shown 
that goals can indeed become automatically activated by subtle situational, though artificial 
features such as supraliminal or subliminal priming (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Stapel 
& Koomen, 2001a, 2001b).  Stapel & Koomen (2001a) primed an interpretation goal, but 
they were keen to observe that their unobtrusive exposure to interpretation related words 
"seems to be a crude proxy for the motive to try to make sense of  the world" (pp. 928).  In Interpretation goal  32 
the present research, we tried to introduce a less "crude proxy" to activate an interpretation 
goal.  A prisoner's dilemma game seems to be a situation, which by its very nature of 
interdependence is strongly associated with interpretative thinking.  As such, we were able 
to demonstrate that an interpretation goal can also become automatically activated by a less 
artifi~ial, more naturalistic environment than was the case in prior research. Interpretation goal  33 
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Footnotes 
1 To ensure that the description was in fact neutral, it was presented to 24 students who 
were asked to evaluate the hostility of "Jan" along a 9-point scale with the endpoints 
labeled not at all hostile and extremely hostile.  The mean rating was approximately at the 
midpoint of the scale (M =  4.63). 
2 Although the interpretation-unrelated words seem to be shorter in word length than the 
interpretation-related words, this is only the case in English and not in Dutch. 
3  Because reaction  time  data  are often skewed,  we  also  ran an  analysis  on logarithmic 
transformations of our reaction time data.  A log transformation is  sometimes applied to 
normalize the data to meet the  assumptions of the statistical tests (as suggested by Fazio, 
1990;  see  also  Bargh  &  Chartrand,  2000).  However,  this  transformation  analysis  was 
similar to our original analysis. 
4  As  in Experiment  1 we  also  conducted an analysis  on  log transformed reaction times, 
which revealed similar results. Interpretation goal  42 
Table 1. 
Mean Reaction Times (in Milliseconds) as a Function of Game Context and Target Words 
(Experiment la) 
Game context 
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Table 2. 
Mean Reaction Times (in Milliseconds) as a Function of Game Context and Target Words 
(Experiment 1  b  ) 
Game context 
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Table 3. 
Mean Hostility Judgments of Jan as a Function of Game Context and Extreme Exemplars 
(Experiment 2) 
Game Context 









Note.  Scale range is from 1 to 9.  Higher scores indicate more negative ratings. Interpretation goal  45 
Table 4. 












Note.  Scale range is from 1 to 9.  Higher scores indicate more negative ratings. 